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Abstract 
 
Many commentators have pointed towards a downturn in the enrolment of students on 
economics degrees. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is probably because 
business studies degrees meet students’ requirements for practical understanding more 
closely. We suggest here that one of the problems with economics is that introductory 
principles courses adopt a ‘theory-first’ pedagogy. This means that students are asked to 
abandon any pre-formed notions/understanding about the nature of competition and 
accept the equilibrium model of perfect competition as the foundation of their future 
understanding. The downside of this approach is that: ‘The everyday appearance of social 
life provides little in the way of verification for the student of basic economic ideas. The 
result is an analytical confusion that captivates the student more or less forever…’ 
Bernstein (2004: 33). By grounding introductory economics on the foundation stone of 
theories of entrepreneurship this problem is  circumvented. Our discussion here suggests 
how entrepreneurship could be introduced to students and how it can lead to a deeper 
understanding of the true nature of the competitive process. The approach we advocate is 
pluralist.  
 
Keywords: entrepreneurship, insufficiency of knowledge, inductive teaching, case study, 
competitive process, evolution. 
 
JEL codes: M13; A22; B40; B52; B53; D01; D02; D20; D80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
Introduction 
 
We begin with some broad observations:  
 
(1)  Many commentators have pointed towards a downturn in the enrolment of students 
on economics degrees (e.g. papers a special issue of the Journal of Economics 
Education, volume 27, Fall 1996; Lewis and Norris, 1997; Ashworth and Evans, 
2001). Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is probably that business 
studies/business administration degrees meet more closely students’ requirements 
for practical understanding. 
(2)  The economics profession has turned inwards to impress peers and has increasingly 
ignored ‘troublesome’ aspects of the real world and disengaged with public 
discourse (Klein, 1999).  
(3)  The student-driven Post-Autistic Economics movement has arisen because of mass 
dissatisfaction with ‘unrealistic’ single-paradigm economics.  
(4)  It is widely accepted that entrepreneurship is a fundamental driving force of 
economic progress in the real world and its study attracts great interest from 
economics and business students alike (witness the growth of courses in 
entrepreneurship and the emphases of governments in both developed and less 
developed countries on developing an ‘enterprise economy’.) 
 
If observations (1) and (2) are correct the profession should be worried and 
looking for ways to repopulate itself. Among others, Geoff Hodgson has stated that  
 
‘Outside, in the business, government and other non-academic 
communities, the perception is widespread and growing of economics as a 
technical and rarefied discipline, of questionable relevance and limited 
practical use. This widespread opinion is manifest in declining student 
enrolments on economics degree courses and in a shift towards close 
substitutes such as business studies  (Hodgson, 1999: 9).  
 
If economics degrees are losing out to close substitutes and if the profession cares about 
this loss of ‘customers’ for its standardised product then the obvious solution would seem 
to be to reinvent the economics we teach at grass roots level (i.e. introductory 
undergraduate level) so that it more closely reflects the needs of the real world. After all, 
the demand for undergraduate courses is a derived demand driven by the requirements of 
employers (in both the private and public sectors) who want recruits who can understand 
real world practicalities.  
Observation (3) suggests that it is not too late to save economics from obscurity; 
the young blood is waiting in the wings and mass-movements like the PAE indicate that 
the customer base is still substantial if only the profession will listen and broaden its 
scope. This is, of course, what the movement towards pluralist economics advocates. 
Observation (4) suggests that the growing emphasis on entrepreneurship as a fundamental 
economic force and the desire of students to learn a more relevant economics can be 
combined to reinvigorate economic theory.  
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It seems clear that many champions of a pluralist approach to economics reside in 
academia but the question of how to replace orthodox theory has large ly focussed on 
post-first-year economics. This seems to reflect an attitude that first-year principles 
courses are more or less fine in their current format because they provide a useful foil 
against which to introduce heterodox economics at a later stage. At first glance this seems 
to be a reasonable teaching strategy, but it raises the problem that students may become 
socialised into mainstream economics and regard the later introduction of heterodox 
economics as mere tinkering. It also means that perfect competition and equilibrium form 
the foundation of the student’s understanding of the economy and may colour all future 
understanding and prove hard to shift; in fact, a process of ‘unlearning’ is likely to be 
needed. As Bernstein (2004) has argued: ‘The everyday appearance of social life 
provides little in the way of verification for the student of basic economic ideas. The 
result is an analytical confusion that captivates the student more or less forever…’ (p.33), 
and: ‘Ironically, the perfect competition model suffers not from being an abstraction from 
reality – indeed all models in all disciplines share that epistemological quality. Rather, 
the pitfall of utilizing the perfect competition framework as a starting point for economic 
reasoning is that it makes a logically coherent understanding of what competition is 
impossible’ (p.34). It is our contention here that taking entrepreneurship as the departure 
point for an introductory principles course overcomes these kinds of difficulties and at 
the same time should make economics a more attractive option relative to its close 
substitutes. 
In the next section we outline the basic principles that a pluralist/heterodox course 
should attempt to reveal to students. We follow this with a brief overview of three ma jor 
economic theories of entrepreneurship before going on to the final section where we 
suggest a teaching strategy for conveying these theories to students. It is not our intention 
to outline what ‘Pluralist Economics 101’ should look like in its entirety, since this is a 
destination for the wider pluralist community to arrive at through discussion and debate, 
but we do indicate how using entrepreneurship as a point of departure can lead 
seamlessly into wider discussions about the true nature of competition.  
 
 
The Basic Principles of Pluralist Economics  
 
In this section we outline the lessons that a pluralist course in economics should aim to 
convey as a minimum requirement. These lessons can be thought of as a destination for 
students so it is neither strictly necessary nor necessarily desirable to be explicit at the 
outset about them in a teaching environment. This is because there is a pedagogical 
argument that students should discover the lessons for themselves since then they are 
more likely to understand their significance (and remember them). 
It is traditional to begin a course in economics with a definition of its scope and 
boundaries, and from a pluralist perspective it is important to work with a definition that 
does not circumscribe the discipline too rigidly. From this standpoint, the familiar 
Robbins/Samuelson definition will not do. In contrast, Alfred Marshall’s definition from 
his Principles seems to fit the bill nicely: 
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Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary 
business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which 
is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the 
material requisites of wellbeing (Marshall, 1920: 1) 
 
Marshall’s definition is useful for pluralist economics to adopt because it is 
specific enough to indicate the general area of study and at the same time broad enough 
to leave its boundaries relatively permeable to a variety of approaches and ideas. We use 
Marshall’s definition here to emphasise three fundamental points:  
 
(1) Economics is about ‘mankind’, which we can interpret to mean real people.  
Consequently economics should take account of the challenges faced by real people with 
respect to what George Shackle (1972) called their ‘insufficiency of knowledge.’ As we 
all know, Friedman (1953) argued that the usefulness of an economic model lies in its 
predictive ability and hence took a methodological position that it was all right for 
economists to think about human beings as if they are fully informed and fully rationa l 
optimising automatons so long as such an approximation to reality predicted well. For a 
long time mainstream diehards (particularly the ‘mathematical formalists’) have taken 
shelter from criticism by ducking behind the barrier of Friedman’s argument as if it were 
an inviolable truth, whilst producing models that were either short on predictive content 
or of questionable empirical validity (such as expected utility theory). This does nothing 
to enhance the credibility of economics in the wider academy: as McCloskey (1999: 117) 
notes, the ‘neighbours of economics hate its arrogance.’.  
The nature of the problem is exemplified by the following vignette: 
 
[As an undergraduate student in economics] I had done well in my studies 
and my department chairman said to me: “It’s time to start getting those 
applications in to graduate school.” I looked at him rather astonished, and 
said, “You don’t think I’m going to graduate school do you?” And he said, 
“Well, of course – you got all As.” I replied “I’m interested in economics, I 
can do it, but I don’t believe it.” (Michael Rothschild, 2000: 285)1 
 
Shackle (1972: 15) points out that the architects of mainstream economics chose 
to ignore ‘the question of what can be known by the maker of choices amongst rival 
available courses of action, and concentrated instead on the logic of comparison amongst 
courses having assumedly known results.’ He asks us to take a step backwards and 
inquire how possible courses of action can be identified in the first place and in so doing 
points us towards an economics in which the imagination of possible futures and courses 
of action must play a central role. In other words an economics where human creativity is 
taken seriously.  
Brian Loasby (1999: 2-7) identifies six obstacles to knowledge in arguing the case 
for basing economics upon explicit recognition that the insufficiency of knowledge is 
pervasive. These can be summarized (without necessarily using his labels) as follows:  
 
                                                 
1 Rothschild chose to go on to business school and law school and later became a consultant. 
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(i) David Hume’s problem : the impossibility of obtaining certain 
knowledge/universal laws. We cannot obtain reliable knowledge about the 
world because it is impossible to observe every occurrence of a phenomenon 
and as a result we cannot say for sure that evidence does not exist which 
refutes the generality of the laws based upon observations derived from a 
sample. Hume’s problem is especially acute when we recognise that we 
cannot possibly know the future with any certainty; in essence all 
expectations that we form about the future are conjectural in the sense that 
they cannot be based on reliable evidence.  
 
(ii) The inherent complexity of the world: if the world is a complex open 
system as, for example, Potts (2000) has argued, then it is impossible for us to 
understand it in its entirety. Complex systems are, ‘…systems with multiple 
elements adapting or reacting to the pattern these elements create…complex 
systems are systems in process, systems that constantly evolve…The patterns 
that are in the process of being formed are too complicated to be worked out 
analytically…’ (Arthur, 2000: 19). Furthermore, in order to build theories it is 
necessary to make simplifying assumptions to keep things manageable (i.e. 
achieve artificial closure) and this renders the theory incomplete and the 
reason for any failure of its predictions impossible to pin down: ‘An open 
system is one whose boundaries are not predetermined. Further, the nature 
and range of its constituent variables and the structure of their 
interrelationships are not predetermined…If reality is an open system, then 
any closed theoretical system can only have partial application’ (Sheila Dow, 
1997: 89-90).  
 
(iii) Bounded rationality: Herbert Simon’s (1957) contention that human 
decision makers would like to act rationally, in the sense of the rational 
economic model, but are prevented from doing so by the cognitive limitations 
of the human brain combined with the overwhelming informational 
requirements (including problems of both information overload regarding 
possible options and those caused by the need to have unknowable 
information about the future) is well known to heterodox economists. As 
Bazerman (2002: 4) has stated, ‘The rational model is based on a set of 
assumptions that prescribe how a decision should be made rather than 
describing how a decision is made.’ Earl (1995) has drawn attention to the 
implications of cognitive facts of life such as Miller’s Rule, while Hallowell 
(2005) has analysed the resulting problem of ‘overloaded mental circuits’. In 
order to overcome their cognitive limitations decision makers in real life use 
rules of thumb (heuristics) to guide decisions and they satisfice rather than 
optimise.  
 
(iv) The ubiquity of change: the analysis of change was central to 
Schumpeter’s interpretation and analysis of the economy and in 
contemporary economics it is explained by evolutionary economists such as 
Nelson and Winter (1982). For evolutionary economists change is a given 
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feature of systems in the real world. This follows from the ‘Red Queen 
Principle’ (Van Valen, 1973) which can be illustrated by the following simple 
example: If two firms share the same market and one develops a new product 
that places the other at a competitive disadvantage, then the desire to regain 
market share will require the other firm to strive to introduce a new product 
too. This will, in turn, lead to further pressure coming to bear on the first firm 
and the cycle will continue. The important point to note here is that change is 
endogenous to the system and, while we may recognise this to be the case, its 
specific form is unpredictable with any degree of certainty. 
 
(v) Richardson’s competitive investment problem: George Richardson 
(1960/1990) pointed out that the realisation of a profit opportunity for a 
particular firm depends in part on the price the product is expected to 
command. He asked, ‘how the members of a system could obtain sufficient 
information on which to base investment decisions’ (p49). The basic problem 
here is that price will be influenced by the plans of other firms who may also 
have recognised the profit opportunity. These plans will be hidden from each 
other a priori and, consequently, there will be a coordination problem that 
may be so severe that if all firms tried to exploit the profit opportunity none 
of them would receive the expected return on their investment. In other words 
all of the potential competitors face the same puzzle and there is no totally 
reliable or simple way to coordinate their activities. For firms to be willing to 
enter a market or expand capacity, they will need to have confidence about 
the limited ability of others to do likewise. 
 
(vi) Richardson’s complementary investment problem: Richardson also 
identified that interdependencies do not only exist in firms’ competitive 
relations with each other. It is also the case that the rewards of a proposed 
action by one independent decision maker may well be contingent upon the 
expectations and plans of one or more other independent decision makers in 
such a way that their relationships are complementary in the sense that ‘…the 
costs of one are reduced when the other is undertaken, or because the demand 
for one of them rises with the increased availability of the output of the 
other.’ (p.78) Furthermore, ‘it is possible for two or more firms to be in a 
complementary relationship without there being transactions between them’ 
(p.73). An example of this would be if a firm supplying several other 
downstream firms were able to exploit increasing returns (and thereby sell on 
at lower prices) if all firms involved invested simultaneously.  
 
 
(2) Economics is not about isolated individuals; it is about ‘social action.’ 
Economics is a social science, so while it is important for economic theory to recognise 
the limits to human knowledge it is also important to recognise that economic decisions 
do not take place in an institutional vacuum (Thorstein Veblen, 1899; Hodgson, 1988). 
Institutions are conventions, routines and procedures that evolve in response to problems 
caused by the insufficiency of knowledge (e.g. uncertainty) that face interacting 
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individuals (Loasby,  1999). While mainstream economics takes individual preferences as 
given and uninfluenced by external forces, the view of institutional economics is that 
individuals are embedded in a social and institutional culture and that they are influenced 
by this environment. Hodgson gives the example of trust to illustrate the importance of 
the concept of the socially embedded individual:  
 
Trust is an interpersonal relationship of some economic significance. Trust is 
an emergent property of an enduring and reciprocal relationship between 
multiple individuals in an institutional context. It is a relational property; not 
something that is the property of isolated individuals. Accordingly, the 
environment of trust, or lack of it, affects individual aims and preferences 
(Hodgson, 2002: xxii). 
 
 
If individuals are socially and institutionally embedded this means that we need to 
understand the impact of their environment to fully understand their behaviour. Given 
that social systems differ both with geographical location and over time this means that a 
general theory of the individual as proposed by mainstream economics is impossible to 
identify. However, Hodgson (2002) also warns that it does not mean individuals are 
influenced solely by institutions any more than it implies acceptance of the doctrine that 
institutions can be explained by the ‘preferences and purposes of individuals alone.’ 
Instead, he advocates following Veblen’s original non-reductionist approach, which does 
not try to explain one level of analysis (e.g. the individual) entirely in terms of another 
level of analysis (e.g. institutions) but instead employs a multi- level, co-evolutionary 
approach.  
In short, then, individuals who suffer from problems of knowledge are embedded 
in complex social/institutional webs (which evolve as time passes and which differ across 
geographical locations). Consequently, the economics we teach should guide students 
towards these two ‘realities’ that face people as they go about the ordinary business of 
life.  
 
(3) Economics is about ‘wellbeing’.  
This can be interpreted as meaning the wellbeing of society as a whole or the wellbeing 
of an individual. Its identification and achievement may be rendered problematic by the 
insufficiency of knowledge of both the economic theorists who study it and the subjects 
of their studies. So, economic analysis necessarily requires the economic theorist to offer 
value judgements and this means that she or he will have to apply critical thinking skills 
and become a practitioner of rhetoric (McCloskey, 1985, 1994).  
 
 
Economic Theories of Entrepreneurship 
 
In their content analysis of the coverage of entrepreneurship in 14 major introductory 
textbooks Calvin Kent & Francis Rushing (1999: 184) report that ‘it appears that 
entrepreneurship still has not worked its way into economics principles texts. As a result, 
students may be left with an incomplete understanding of the economic process.’ This is 
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hardly a surprising finding – principles texts are almost exclusively mainstream in their 
outlook and a meaningful discussion of entrepreneurship cannot simply be bolted-on to a 
framework that has been designed to ignore the phenomena of insufficiency of 
knowledge and the process of change. For example, consider the decision to start a firm. 
In the real world this is a task that is riddled with uncertainty, but the mainstream 
perspective ignores the insufficiency of knowledge that gives rise to the uncertainty. In 
fact, the entrepreneur in the mainstream theory of the firm is assumed to have full (ex 
ante) knowledge about: the availability of factor inputs; the quality of factor inputs;
 the variety of ways in which factor inputs can be combined; and buyers’ demand 
for the firm’s product. This means that the practical questions that would face and 
challenge a real world entrepreneur are absent and the entrepreneur’s choices are 
automatic.  
Two things in particular are glossed over by the mainstream theory of the firm. 
The first is the question of how the business opportunity that led to the founding of the 
firm emerged in the first place; here the assumption is that business opportunities will be 
automatically recognised and acted upon. The second is how the entrepreneur decides on 
the best way to obtain, organise and utilise the inputs and productive resources under her 
or his control. The assumption here is that if two entrepreneurs had access to the same 
quantity and quality of inputs and factor services, then we could expect both to utilise and 
organise these assets in an identical way within their respective firms. In other words, the 
rival firms would not only be as efficient as each other, but each firm would be expected 
to operate at optimum efficiency. The implications of these assumptions for our 
understanding of the nature of competition are well known and exemplified by the theory 
of perfect competition. However, even with the more realistic- looking theory of 
monopolistic competition, from which emerged the ‘4Ps of marketing’ (competition via 
not merely price but also place, product and promotion), textbook treatments ignore the 
knowledge issues that Chamberlin (1933) wrestled with in his original exposition and 
which lead real businesses to choose different marketing mixes. 
As Stan Metcalfe (2004: 157) says, ‘Economic theory and the entrepreneur have  
never made easy travelling companions,’ and he concludes that this is because of the 
treatment of knowledge. Entrepreneurship is about creating new knowledge and ushering 
in change of one sort or another, it is about choosing to make resource commitments in 
the present in the face of an uncertain future in the sense of Frank Knight (1921). Hence 
it necessarily deals with questions that are beyond the scope of rational choice theory and 
that implies that any serious treatment lies firmly in the domain of heterodox economics.  
Several serious theories of entrepreneurship have been proposed in the literature 
and each one has something useful to contribute to a more complete understanding of the 
economic role of entrepreneurship. Here we provide a brief overview of three major 
contributions. Each theory offers its own definition of entrepreneurship and in so doing 
tries to bring precision to the topic at the cost of apparently excluding the definitions 
offered by alternative theories. To the extent that alternative theories provide useful 
insights there would appear to be a need for synthesis here. We comment on this in the 
final section.  
 
(i) Schumpeter on the entrepreneur as innovator 
 9
Schumpeter (1934, 1942) is very clear about the role of entrepreneurs in society. In 
essence they are the primary agents of economic development and change and they think 
up ways of putting scarce resources to new uses. They do this by carrying out one or 
more of five broad activities:  
 
· introducing new goods or a new quality of good;  
· introducing new ways of producing goods;  
· opening up new markets (usually overseas);  
· discovering new sources of supply of raw materials or partly-manufactured goods; 
and  
· reorganising the structure of an industry (for example, by creating a monopoly or 
breaking up a monopoly situation).  
 
Each of these activities is an example of innovation.  
Schumpeter is very precise about the meaning of innovation, in particular he is 
very careful to distinguish between invention and imitation. Invention is an activity 
which can be thought of as more in the realm of the creation of scientific knowledge than 
business, although this is not necessarily the case, and it provides a possible source of 
raw material upon which entrepreneurial individuals can draw as they seek out business 
opportunities (one might think of the scientific knowledge that underpins everyday 
commercial products such as the light bulb, the motor car, and the aeroplane). Innovation 
on the other hand refers to the very first commercial application of what up to that point 
has remained non-commercialised knowledge and the first person to do this is called the 
entrepreneur.  
Schumpeter points out that ‘to produce means to combine materials and forces 
within our reach’ and that the same materials may well be used in different ways. He 
describes these potential alternatives as new combinations and identifies the 
entrepreneur’s role as the discovery and commercialisation of new combinations. The 
second person in the market is not an entrepreneur according to Schumpeter’s definition 
because the first person has already shown the way. The second and subsequent 
entrants/adopters are simply imitators. 
Schumpeter’s discussion also points out that a particular person should only be 
described as an entrepreneur at the point when she or he first introduces their innovation. 
The subsequent activity of running and managing the resulting business is not 
entrepreneurship in Schumpeter’s view – it is instead the more routine job of business 
administration. However, Schumpeter also points out that an entrepreneur does not 
necessarily have to be a business proprietor; it is quite plausible within his definition of 
entrepreneurship for a manager employed by a firm to carry out an entrepreneurial act 
and, in fact, given the prevalence of large corporations within the developed economies 
of the world this implies that continued business success may well depend upon the 
development of entrepreneurially inclined executives – in other words, intrapreneurship 
(see Meyer & Heppard, 2000).  
Schumpeter draws a clear distinction between entrepreneurs and capitalists. 
Capitalists are the providers of finance; they lend money to entrepreneurs and as such 
Schumpeter is adamant that entrepreneurs do not bear the financial risks associated with 
their novel actions. This is a point of contention. The problem with Schumpeter’s view on 
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this point is that by definition the outcome of innovative activity is uncertain and it may 
be very difficult to persuade third parties to invest in unproven activities. Equally, the 
entrepreneur may be reluctant to reveal the innovative idea to a third party because this 
will open her up to a potential competitor (although the degree of tacit knowledge 
required to put the idea into operation may provide some protection here).  
 
(ii) Hayek and Kirzner on the entrepreneur as the source of equilibrium forces in 
competitive markets 
The various writings of Friedrich Hayek (e.g. 1948) and Israel Kirzner (e.g. 1979) are 
classed as major contributions to the Austrian tradition of economics. The Austrian 
analysis of the entrepreneur is intimately associated with the quest for a deeper 
understanding of the workings of the dynamics of markets that already exist.2 Austrian 
economists take as their point of departure the notion that market equilibrium is the end 
result of the economic process and as such it is a relatively uninteresting phenomenon. 
The implication of their view is that economists ought to devote most of their time and 
energy to developing a deeper understanding of the disequilibrium processes that 
generate eventual equilibrium outcomes because it is only when a market is in 
disequilibrium that active decisions are being taken by suppliers and demanders. The 
Austrian theory of the entrepreneur is developed in this disequilibrium context. 
If a market is in equilibrium it implies that entrepreneurs and their customers have 
arrived at a state of the world where neither group has any incentive to change their 
trading behaviour. From an entrepreneur’s perspective this means that no further profit 
opportunities remain to be exploited in the market.  
Hayek describes the equilibrium state as one where everyone has full information 
about potential trading opportunities and where everyone has acted optimally in the light 
of this information. Disequilibrium behaviour is therefore exemplified firstly by the 
acquisition of useful knowledge and, secondly, by its communication. For example, an 
entrepreneur may have acquired some useful knowledge that enables her or him to obtain 
a particular good at a cost that is lower than is being achieved by rival entrepreneurs, but 
unless this fact is communicated to customers (in the form of lower asking prices) they 
are unlikely to switch their custom away from the low-cost entrepreneur’s rivals. For 
Hayek the disequilibrium market process can usefully be described as a process of 
discovery. For example, the entrepreneur discovers whether asking prices and product 
quality are appropriate while customers discover who is able to supply them with goods 
of acceptable quality at prices that offer them value for money.  
Kirzner picks up Hayek’s theme and points out disequilibrium situations can arise 
because of interspatial (geographical) differences between suppliers and demanders 
which give rise to opportunities for arbitrage. According to Kirzner anyone who practises 
arbitrage is an entrepreneur. In fact the key characteristic of the entrepreneur for Kirzner 
is alertness to such potential sources of profit. 
Another source of disequilibrium arises because of intertemporal differences 
between supply and demand. The entrepreneur who is alert to this situation undertakes to 
obtain or produce goods or services without knowing what the quantity demanded will 
                                                 
2 Austrian economics is far from unified. See Gloria-Palermo (1999) for an illuminating discussion 
of contrasting Austrian conceptions of the market process. 
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be. The entrepreneur in this situation takes a truly heroic decision in the sense that she 
faces uncertainty rather than calculable risk. 
The focus of Hayek and Kirzner is on explaining movements towards equilibrium 
in markets that already exist as a result of the actions of individuals who are alert to profit 
opportunities. It thus contrasts with Schumpeter’s contention that the entrepreneur is an 
innovator and therefore a destroyer of equilibrium situations. Clearly there is scope to 
reconcile the two perspectives by broadening out Schumpeter’s somewhat dogmatic 
insistence that entrepreneurship equates solely to innovation (cf. Kirzner, 1999). 
 
(iii) Casson on the entrepreneur as a specialist in coordination 
Mark Casson (1982/2003) formulated his theory of entrepreneurship as a step towards a 
more comprehensive project (Casson,1997) in which he developed a ‘vision of the 
economy as a system of structured information flow.’ He begins with a critique of 
General Equilibrium theory and in particular its reliance upon the fictitious Walrasian 
auctioneer as the agent of coordination in the economy. In the real economy buyers wants 
are coordinated with the outputs of suppliers without the aid of a Walrasian auctioneer. 
Casson investigates how coordination actually occurs and he places the entrepreneur at 
the heart of the process.  
Casson (2003: 20) starts his detailed analysis with a very precise definition: ‘an 
entrepreneur is someone who specializes in taking judgemental decisions about the 
coordination of scarce resources.’ Three key points arise out of this definition.  
The first point is that the entrepreneur is a specialist at what she or he does. From 
an economics perspective when somebody specialises in an activity they do so because 
they have a comparative advantage. The economic theory of comparative advantage  
implies that relative capabilities of individuals are fixed which means that this 
assumption requires us to ignore the effects of education, training and practice which will 
allow people to improve their capabilities as time passes. However, this observation does 
not pose a problem for Casson because he argues that the core capabilities (qualities) of 
the entrepreneur (which are the source of her or his comparative advantage) are very 
difficult or impossible to learn — in fact he argues that some of these capabilities are 
more or less innate. Furthermore, he suggests that these innate capabilities are unevenly 
distributed throughout the population and that they are scarce. From a list of decision-
making qualities that includes self-knowledge, imagination, practical knowledge, 
analytical ability, search skill, foresight, computational skill, and communication skill, he 
constructs a hierarchy in which imagination and foresight are identified as being critical. 
Imagination is required in order to perceive of alternative ways in which resources can be 
utilised while foresight is a complement to imagination and entrepreneurs especially need 
it because there may well be a shortage of suitable data to collect as a result of the 
novelty of the alternatives conjured up at the imagination stage. Someone who possesses 
only one of these two qualities will not make a successful entrepreneur; ideally the 
entrepreneur should possess all of the qualities (i.e. be a generalist). However, Casson 
argues that the nature of the other qualities is such that they are perhaps less difficult to 
hire in than the two essential ones and it may therefore be possible to employ other 
people who possess the requisite ‘missing’ qualities. Because of difficulties with 
identifying these qualitie s in people, he does not suggest that this task is an easy one. 
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Furthermore, if the ‘hiring in’ route is followed, it will be essential for the entrepreneur 
possess the two extra capabilities of delegation skills and organisational skills. 
The second important point highlighted by Casson’s definition is the judgemental 
nature of the decisions that the entrepreneur makes. Judgemental decisions are those for 
which the decision-maker does not have objective criteria to guide her or his choice. 
Judgemental decisions involve different perceptions of problems and issues, different 
interpretations and possibly access to different information. Typically an entrepreneur 
can be thought of as someone who judges situations and opportunities differently from 
the majority of other people — in essence, it is this difference of opinion that allows the 
entrepreneur to act when others will not do so.  
The third important point highlighted in Casson’s definition is that when an 
entrepreneur coordinates scarce resources she or he essentially reallocates them to 
alternative uses. In other words, Casson’s approach is consistent with the Austrian and 
Schumpeterian notion that the entrepreneur is an agent of change. Unlike Schumpeter, 
however, Casson is very clear that entrepreneurship is an ongoing function rather than a 
one-off act of innovation. His argument in support of this contention is that change is 
endemic in economic systems so entrepreneurs essentially spend most of their time 
looking out for new information that makes the current allocation of resources appear to 
be inefficient. 
Casson goes on to develop the implications of his definition in some detail and, at 
the risk of oversimplifying his argument, we can say that he makes the point that in order 
to execute a reallocation of scarce resources — that is, to carry out the role of coordinator 
— the entrepreneur must have control over these resources. In a capitalist system this is 
achieved by taking control of the relevant resources, in other words the entrepreneur has 
to buy or hire them. This observation is compatible with a number of activities including: 
starting up a new firm; taking over an inefficient established firm; and acting as an 
arbitrageur.  
Casson extends his theory with an analysis of the crucial role played by the 
entrepreneur in the setting up of markets (which gives his theory a certain resonance with 
Schumpeter). The purpose of a market is to allow buyers and sellers to trade with each 
other. Mainstream economics assumes that markets spontaneously arise and that they are 
costless to use but Casson points out that markets do not simply appear out of the ether 
but are constructed by human action, in particular by entrepreneurs.  
There are six main obstacles to trade and each arises because of a lack of 
information:  
 
(1) the need for the potential buyer and seller to find each other;  
(2) the need for each party to communicate reciprocal wants;  
(3) the need to negotiate a price;  
(4) the need to exchange custody of the goods in return for payment;  
(5) the need to screen for quality of the goods (in other words, are the goods up to 
the promised specification?);  
(6) the need to be able to enforce compensation if the goods are revealed not to be 
of the promised specification.  
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Overcoming each of the six obstacles in turn can be thought of as taking the steps 
required for a successful trade to take place or, as Casson puts it, each step is designed to 
take transactors from a state of mutual isolation towards the successful completion of a 
trade.  
Casson’s chief point is that if entrepreneurs wish to sell their goods then they have 
to take the initiative in constructing mechanisms/institutions to overcome these obstacles 
to trade — customers have little or no role to play here — and, as a result, the costs of 
setting up a market are borne by the entrepreneur in the first instance. Furthermore, these 
are sunk costs that typically have to be made in advance of any trading activity and which 
continue to be incurred ahead of the receipt of sales revenue. These sunk costs include 
resources devoted to product development and copyrighting, highly specific tooling and 
other equipment, signs, logos, and other marketing expenses, and the opportunity cost of 
the entrepreneur’s time. They make the entrepreneur vulnerable, given the uncertainties 
associated with subsequent revenue.  
The strong implication of Casson’s perspective is that entrepreneurs need to 
possess or to acquire excellent bargaining skills if they are to recover upfront investments 
and correspondingly make a profit from their superior ability at making judgemental 
decisions. Since entrepreneurs have to perform their function actively, rather than sit back 
and let the other factors of production do all of the work, Casson does not see 
entrepreneurial profit as a residual (as in mainstream treatments) but instead as earned 
income.  
 
 
Using Entrepreneurship as a Departure Point 
 
We have suggested above that a useful strategy to adopt in teaching introductory pluralist 
economics is to structure the course so that students are able to discover for themselves 
some of the basic facts of economic life. But how can we use entrepreneurship to do this? 
Traditionally introductory economics teaching involves explicitly laying down basic 
axioms rather than investigation of real world phenomena — it is a ‘blackboard subject’ 
(McCloskey, 1999). Using entrepreneurship as a point of departure means that this 
approach is not viable — not least because there is no unified theory of entrepreneurship. 
However, far from being a weakness the multiplicity of theories about entrepreneurship is 
a major strength in terms of providing a forum for accelerating students’ attainment of the 
transferable skill of critical reasoning (Thomson, 2002) that is one of the fundamental 
aims of a university education. 3 In place of this theory-first approach we suggest that it is 
no bad thing to copy those economists who built their theories on careful observation of 
real world practices. Three who immediately spring to mind here are Alfred Marshall 
(1920) and P.W.S. Andrews (1949), and Neil Kay (1997), each of whom developed their 
respective theories of the firm and industry after careful study of the real world 
institutions they observed in the economy. As John Kay (1991: 57) tells us: ‘Marshall’s 
analysis, and his understanding of the commerce of his day, was sophisticated and wide-
                                                 
3 Note, however, that differences in rates of progress in this respect may result in pluralistic 
teaching being seen in very different ways by members of a particular class — cf. the discussion 
in Earl (1995: 1-11; 2000) of William Perry’s six stage taxonomy of intellectual progression.  
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ranging. Indeed, Marshall probably knew more about the day-to-day functioning of 
business than any leading economist this century.’  
The way forward then lies in developing an inductive approach to teaching and 
theory building – this means moving from specific examples towards general theories 
(Stewart, 1979). The aim here is to provide a forum where students can attempt to make 
sense of real world  phenomena rather than be spoon-fed hard core axioms which they are 
later expected to apply deductively. This requires us to begin our teaching with real world 
data, and the most accessible form of data for non-technical neophytes can be found in 
case studies. In his discussion of ‘post Marshallian’ research methods John Finch (1999: 
157) points out that: ‘…case study research is deemed appropriate as it has the potential 
to uncover anomalies and alternative causal explanations…’ This is precisely what a 
pluralist approach would advocate and it moves economics towards Paul Ormerod’s 
(2003: 73) vision of it, ‘as more of a way of thinking about the world which can be of 
help in understanding a wide range of business, economic and social issues’. 
Furthermore, in a recent piece of research into different ‘teaching- learning environments 
in economics’ Nicola Reimann (2004: 31) cites several (empirical) educational studies, 
from a multitude of other disciplines, which have, ‘emphasised the benefits of an 
inductive, problem-first approach for active construction of conceptual understand ing and 
the acquisition of expert problem-solving strategies.’ 
Advocacy of an inductive teaching strategy does not mean that students should be 
left to formulate ideas unaided; the lecturer is there to guide thinking towards the theories 
that she or he deems to be important — we should heed David Colander’s (2004: 65) 
point that, ‘A good teacher indoctrinates a student; the student and teacher are not on a 
joint voyage of discovery.’ So, where might we expect a case study approach to 
entrepreneurship lead us?  
The first practical hurdle is to obtain some suitable case studies. Typically the 
case studies available from depositories such as Harvard Business School can be useful 
but they are not particularly well focussed from an economics perspective. A more 
suitable but labour intensive approach is for lecturers to write their own cases from 
published sources. This means they can tailor the case to emphasise the stories they are 
trying to reveal (a bit like leaving clues in a treasure hunt). This is the strategy adopted in 
Earl and Wakeley (2005) where we have constructed cases of Richard Branson’s early 
years, Victor Kiam and his buyout of Remington, and James Dyson’s struggles to get his 
Dual Cyclone vacuum cleaners to market. Each of these cases contributes something 
useful to drawing out various aspects of the three theories of the entrepreneur discussed 
above. For example, the Richard Branson case study can be used to construct a list of key 
words or phrases that describe what entrepreneurs do. Our suggested list includes:  
 
· take risks;  
· make decisions about entering markets;  
· exercise foresight;  
· exercise creativity; employ other people; persuade others;  
· sell; 
· make things happen;  
· create companies;  
· perceive business opportunities;  
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· manage the workforce.  
 
Each of these phrases can be used as topic of debate in a classroom setting and can be 
used in conjunction with the other cases to tease out an understanding of the nature of 
entrepreneurship. When the various theories of entrepreneurship are introduced to 
students they are then better able to reconcile the different views or argue for the 
relevance of one theory relative to another by appealing to the stories to which they have 
been exposed. But understanding entrepreneurship for its own sake is not the aim, it is 
instead a stepping-stone for developing a deeper understanding of the true nature of the 
competitive process. This is the important point. 
By confronting students with these kinds of stories, lecturers can begin to build a 
picture of the dynamics of competition as a process in real time being carried out by real 
people who suffer from an insufficiency of knowledge. This means that the model of 
perfect competition, which pervades mainstream teaching, does not need to be given 
primacy and, consequently, the problems mentioned by Bernstein (2004) above can be 
mitigated. The fundamental lesson that a profit opportunity for everyone is a benefit to 
nobody can be taught instead from the perspective of the capabilities approach to 
economics (George Richardson, 1960/1990; Edith Penrose, 1959). It also means that the 
formal and informal institutions which provide structure in the economy and which help 
overcome problems with the insufficiency of knowledge can be brought into the picture 
at the earliest opportunity (for example, Richa rd Branson developed Virgin by relying 
heavily on informal networks of expertise, and he relied on his bank manager for 
finance). 
Ultimately by placing the stories of real life entrepreneurs in front of students and 
encouraging them to draw out their implications a lecturer can lead students to discover 
the evolutionary logic which underlies the competitive process (Kenneth Boulding, 1981; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1999) and avoid trapping them in the restrictive 
mechanistic metaphor used by mainstream approaches. Evolution will happen because 
when economic actors are characterised by an insufficiency of knowledge their resource 
commitments will have to be based on conjectures about the future and the passage of 
time will prove many of these conjectures wrong. Evidence that conjectures are incorrect 
will lead to learning and adaptive adjustment (see Harper, 1996).  
Hayek (1948: 92) said that, ‘…the general view seems still to regard the 
conception of competition currently employed by economists as the significant one and 
treat that of the businessman as an abuse.’ If we place the entrepreneur at the heart of 
introductory economics this view does not have to persist.  
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